The legal culture of Canada

There is no dissent.

In the C2C Journal, there are some interesting articles. This is one of them. Written by Bob Tarantino, it describes the complete hegemony of the Charter interpreting class. Says Tarantino:

Appreciating how the law works requires accepting that if you want different decisions from the courts, the only option is to have different judges.

Recall that when the Supremes nixed Nadon’s appointment from the Federal Court, they also declared themselves to be a constitutionally protected institution. At the same time as they wrecked the advancement of Federal Court judges to the Supreme Court, they insulated themselves from any change. Said the Court at paragraph 74 of Nadon:

We disagree. Parliament cannot unilaterally change the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada. Essential features of the Court are constitutionally protected under Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Changes to the composition of the Court can only be made under the procedure provided for in s. 41 [1] of the Constitution Act, 1982  and therefore require the unanimous consent of Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Changes to the other essential features of the Court can only be made under the procedure provided for in s. 42 [2] of the Constitution Act, 1982 , which requires the consent of at least seven provinces representing, in the aggregate, at least half of the population of all the provinces

Tarantino again:

Injecting more conservative and libertarian principles into the legal system requires, at a minimum, injecting more conservative lawyers into the legal system. The goal is not to displace progressives in the legal community, but rather to supplement their presence with conservative/libertarian intellectual counterweights, so that the field of contest is not dominated by progressives to the point of excluding competing conceptions of the law. “Political” judges are not a problem; but uniformly political judges are. The law develops in an impoverished way if only “progressive” views dominate and inform decisions from the bench. For the vitality of the law to be maintained, judicial decision-making must be a crucible of debate over what the law is, its purpose and its application, from a variety of perspectives.